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Abstract
A multi-party contract signing protocol allows a set of participants to exchange messages with each other with a view to
arriving in a state in which each of them has a pre-agreed contract text signed by all the others. Garay and Mackenzie (GM)
proposed such protocol based on private contract signatures, but it was later shown to be ﬂawed by Chadha, Kremer and
Scedrov (CKS); the authors CKS also provided a ﬁx to the GM protocol by revising one of its sub-protocols.
We show an attack on the revised GM protocol for any number (n > 4) of signers. Furthermore, we argue that our attack
shows that the message exchange structure of GM’s main protocol is ﬂawed: whatever the trusted party does will result in
unfairness for some signer. This means that it is impossible to deﬁne a trusted party protocol for Garay and MacKenzie’s
main protocol; we call this “resolve-impossibility”.
We propose a new optimistic multi-party contract signing protocol, also based on private contract signatures. We present
a proof that our protocol satisﬁes fairness as well as its formal analysis in NuSMV model checker for the case of ﬁve signers.
The protocol requires n(n− 1)(n/2 + 1)messages to be sent in the optimistic execution, which is about half the number of
messages required by the state-of-the-art Baum-Waidner and Waidner protocol, and in contrast with Baum-Waidner and
Waidner, it does not use a non-standard notion of a signed contract.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A contract signing protocol allows a set of participants to exchange messages with each other with a view to
arriving in a state in which each of them has a pre-agreed contract text signed by all the others. An important
property of contract signing protocols is fairness: no participant should be left in the position of having sent
another participant his signature on the contract, but not having received signatures from the other participants.
One way in which this can be achieved is by employing a trusted party T . All the signers of the contract send
their signatures to T . When T has them all, he sends them out to each of the signers. It would be desirable to have
a protocol which does not require a trusted party, but this is known to be impossible for deterministic protocols
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[9]. This has led to the invention of “optimistic protocols”, which employ a trusted party only in the case that
something goes wrong. If all the signers are honest and there are no adverse network delays which prevent the
protocol from completing, the trusted party is not needed. But if a participant of the protocol has sent messages
which commit him to the contract and has not received corresponding commitment from the other participants,
he can contact the trusted party who will intervene.
As well as fairness, there are other desired properties of contract signing protocols. Timeliness ensures that
every signer has some recourse to prevent endless waiting. A third property called abuse-freeness [10] guarantees
that a signer is not able to prove to an external observer that she is in a position to choose between successfully
completing the protocol and aborting it. This property is desirable because being in such a position would give
the signer an unfair advantage.
Optimistic contract signing protocols have been ﬁrst described for synchronous networks in [2,3,18]. Two-
party protocols for asynchronous networks (where messages may be delayed arbitrarily) have been proposed in
[4,10,18]. Later, two protocols for the n-party case were proposed: one by Garay and MacKenzie [11] and the
other one by Baum-Waidner and Waidner [6]. Both of them consist of a main (“optimistic”) part which does not
involve the trusted party, together with subprotocols involving a trusted party used in the case that the signers
do not receive expected messages.
Garay andMacKenzie’s protocol (whichwe callGM)allows an arbitrary number n ≥ 2 of signers to exchange
signed contracts. A feature of GM is its use of private contract signatures to guarantee abuse-freeness. GM was
shown by Chadha et al. [7] to fail the fairness property for the case n ≥ 4. Those authors presented a revised
version of the trusted party subprotocol. They veriﬁed the original main protocol together with the revised
trusted party subprotocol for n ≤ 4.
Baum-Waidner and Waidner’s protocol (BW) was also analysed in [7], and was not found to be ﬂawed. It
requires (n+ 1)n(n− 1) messages in the “optimistic” execution, where n is the number signers and the number
of dishonest signers can be up to n− 1. However, their protocol is based on a non-standard notion of a signed
contract: a contract on a text m signed by an agent A is deﬁned to be a tuple (m, n+ 1) digitally signed by A. Any
other digitally signed (m, i)with i < n+ 1 is not considered to be a signed contract; it is merelyA’s promise to sign
the contract. Such a notion has undesirable side-effects. The validity of the contract produced by Baum-Waidner
and Waidners’s protocol depends on the integer it is tupled with. Hence, when a party is presented with such
contract it must be able to reliably establish n+ 1 (which could, for instance, be embedded in the body of the
contract m) and compare with the integer that the contract is tupled with.
Baum-Waidner [5] further reduced the complexity of the previous scheme. This was achieved by adjusting
trusted party T ’s protocol with an assumption that T knows in advance the number of dishonest signers (and
sets the parameters of its protocol accordingly) and fairness is guaranteed provided all honest signers continue
the protocol (i.e. if some honest signer decides to quit, when the protocol requires it to participate, fairness
cannot be guaranteed for other honest signers).
Our contribution. We show that the revised GM protocol presented in [7] also fails the fairness property, for
the cases n ≥ 5. Furthermore, we argue that our attack shows that the protocol cannot guarantee fairness for
any n ≥ 5 whatever the trusted authority T does, i.e. we show that no trusted party protocol is possible in order
to ﬁx the unfairness and the very idea behind Garay and MacKenzie’s main protocol is ﬂawed. A preliminary
version of this work has been published as [16].
Next, we propose a new optimistic multi-party contract signing protocol based on private contract signatures
that employs the ideas of Chadha, Kremer and Scedrov for the trusted party. In contrast with the state-of-art
Baum-Waidner and Waidner protocol, our protocol does not use a non-standard notion of a signed contract
and achieves improvement in the message complexity of the optimistic execution without assuming that T or
any signer know the total number of dishonest signers. Our scheme requires n(n− 1)n/2 + 1 messages, which
is about half the complexity of the previous protocol by Baum-Waidner and Waidner [6]. For example, if n = 6
our protocol requires 120 messages to “optimistically" sign a contract, whereas the previous scheme requires
210. We also present a proof that our protocol satisﬁes fairness, and give its formal analysis in NuSMV model
checker for the case of ﬁve signers. An early version of some of this work was presented in [15].
Outline. Section 2 introduces the basic notions and assumptions about contract signing. In the following two
sections we describe the revised GM protocol, and our analysis of it, including the impossibility of providing
274 A. Mukhamedov, M.D. Ryan / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 272–290
a resolve protocol. Next, in Section 5, we describe our protocol followed by a proof that our protocol satisﬁes
fairness in Section 6 and its formal analysis in NuSMV model checker for the case of ﬁve signers in Section 7.
We conclude in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
Let P1, . . . , Pn denote signers, who want to sign a contract m and T a trusted third party. Signers may adhere
to the protocol, or they may be dishonest, i.e. deviate from the protocol. We assume that up to n− 1 of signers
may be dishonest and are coordinated by a single party, an adversary. We assume that signers and their public
keys are ﬁxed in advance, all contracts are distinct and include the ordered list of all signers. SPi (x) denotes Pi’s
universally-veriﬁable signature on x.
We shall say that Pi has a valid contract m from Pj if it receives Pj’s signature on m or on (m, i) for some
integer i. When Pi runs a contract signing protocol and acquires a valid contract m, we say “Pi decides signed”.
Otherwise, if it quits or receives an abort token from T , we say “Pi decides failed”.
We consider an asynchronous communication model with no global clocks, where messages can be arbi-
trarily delayed. However, the communication channels between signers and the trusted party T are assumed to
be resilient, viz. the messages are guaranteed to be delivered eventually. The adversary is allowed to schedule
and insert its own messages into the network.
An optimistic contract signing protocol consists of two protocols, one executed by signer (Main), and an-
other by trusted party T (Abort or Resolve). Usually signers try to achieve the exchange by executing Main.
They contact T using Abort or Resolve only if something goes amiss in Main. Once a participant contacts T ,
it no longer takes part in Main. A request to T via Abort or Resolve can result in T sending back an abort
token or a signed contract. The decision of whether to reply with an abort token or a signed contract is taken
by T on the basis of the evidence included in the request, and also the previous requests that have been made by
other participants. T has the property that if it decides to send back a signed contract, it sticks to that decision
when answering further requests from other participants. However, if it issues an abort, it may later overturn
that abort and reply with a signed contract in order to maintain fairness. Lastly, once a signer receives a reply
from T to its abort or resolve request, it quits the protocol. Therefore, a fair protocol must guarantee that
an honest participant (namely, one who adheres to the protocol) will not receive an abort and later have it
overturned.
An optimistic contract signing protocol is expected to guarantee fairness. It is also desirable for the protocol
to guarantee abuse-freeness and timeliness.
Deﬁnition 1. An optimistic contract signing protocol is said to be fair for an honest signer Pi if whenever some
signer Pj obtains a valid contract from Pi , then Pi can obtain a valid contract from Pk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Deﬁnition 2. An optimistic contract signing protocol is said to be abuse-free if it is impossible for any set of
signers at any point in the protocol to be able to prove to an outside party that they have the full power to
terminate or successfully complete the contract signing.
Deﬁnition 3. An optimistic contract signing protocol is said to satisfy timeliness if each signer has a recourse to
stop endless waiting for expected messages.
PCS promises.
The protocols in this paper employ a cryptographic primitive known as private contract signature [10]. A
private contract signature by Pi for Pj on text m with respect to trusted party T , denoted PCSPi (m, Pj , T), is a
cryptographic object with the following properties:
(1) PCSPi (m, Pj , T) can be created by Pi , and also by Pj .
(2) Each of Pi , Pj and T (but no-one else) can tell the difference between the versions created by Pi or Pj .
(3) PCSPi (m, Pj , T) can be converted into a universally-veriﬁable signature SPi (m)by Pi , and by T ; and by no-one
else.
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The idea is that PCSPi (m, Pj , T) acts as a promise by Pi to Pj to sign m. But Pj cannot prove to anyone except T
that he has this promise, since he can create it himself and only T can tell the difference between one created
by Pi and one created by Pj . The trusted party T has the power to convert a promise by some P to sign m to a
proper signature by P on m.
A PCS promise may be trusted party invisible, where it is impossible for any recipient of SPi (m) to distin-
guish whether it was converted from PCSPi (m, Pj , T) by Pi or by the trusted party T ; it may also be trusted party
accountable where such distinguishability is possible.
3. GM protocol revised by [7]
The protocol is an optimistic protocol, and therefore consists of two subprotocols, called Main and Abort/
Resolve. Usually signers try to achieve the exchange by executing Main.
Main protocol. The main protocol for n participants is divided into n levels. For each level, a different strength
of promise is used. An i-level promise from A to B is implemented as PCSA((m, i),B, T). Intuitively, the higher i
is, the more A is committed to signing m, and hence, the stronger the promise is. We use SP (m) to denote the
message m signed by P . The protocol for Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is described in Table 1.
(Revised) Abort and Resolve protocols. The original Abort and Resolve protocols [11] were shown to be ﬂawed
by Chadha et al. [7]. Those authors also proposed revised versions of the Abort and Resolve protocols, which
they analysed and showed to be error-free for values of n ≤ 4. We recall their revised versions here.
When Pi requests resolve from T , it sends evidence to T which consists of promises at various levels from
the other participants. This evidence is designed so that T can infer the promises that an honest participant
would have sent when it launched the resolve protocol (note that a participant may have dishonestly sent other
promises). When Pi requests resolve, it sends the message
SPi ({PCSPj ((m, j), Pi , T)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, SPi ((m, 1)))
where j is computed as following:
(1) If Pi runs the resolve protocol in step 5 of themain protocol (see Table 1), then j = 1 for j > i and j = i − 1
for j < i.
(2) In step 6.2 of the main protocol, j = a− 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ a− 1, j /= i and j = 1 for j > a− 1.
(3) In step 6.4 of the main protocol, j = a− 1 for j < i, j = a for i < j ≤ a and j = 1 for j > a.
(4) In step 7 of the main protocol, j = n for all j.
(5) In step 9 of the main protocol, j = n for all j < i and j = n+ 1 for all j > i.
T maintains the set S(m) of indices of participants that contacted T in the past and received an abort token.
For each participant Pi in the set S(m), T also maintains two integer variables hi(m) and li(m) that it calculates
on the basis of the promises that Pi provides in its resolve request. Intuitively, hi corresponds to the highest level
promise an honest Pi could have sent to any higher indexed participant before it contacted T . li corresponds
the highest level promise an honest Pi could have sent to a lower indexed participant before it contacted T . The
protocol for T works as follows:
• If T ever replies with a signed contract for m, then T responds with the contract for any further request from
any participant.
• If the ﬁrst request to T is a resolve request, then T sends back a signed contract.
• If the ﬁrst request is an abort request, then T aborts the contract. T may overturn this decision in the future
if it can deduce that all the participants in S(m) have behaved dishonestly. T deduces that a participant Pi in
S(m) is dishonest when contacted by Pj if
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Table 1
GM multi-party contract-signing protocol—Main for Pi
Wait for all higher recursive levels to start
1. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, 1), Pi , T) (n ≥ j > i)
If Pi does not receive 1-level promises from Pn . . . Pi+1 in a timely manner, then Pi simply quits.
Start recursive level i
2. Pi → Pj : PCSPi ((m, 1), Pj , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
Wait for recursive level i-1 to finish
3. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, i − 1), Pi , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
If Pi does not receive (i-1)-level promises from Pi−1 . . . P1 in a timely manner, then Pi requests abort.
Send i-level promises to all lower-numbered signers
4. Pi → Pj : PCSPi ((m, i), Pj , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
Finish recursive level i when i-level promises are received
5. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, i), Pi , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
If Pi does not receive i-level promises from Pi−1 . . . P1 in a timely manner, then Pi requests resolve.
Complete all higher recursive levels
For a = i + 1 to n, Pi does the following:
6.1. Pi → Pa: PCSPi ((m, a− 1), Pa , T)
6.2. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, a), Pi , T) (a ≥ j > i)
If Pi does not receive a-level promises from Pa . . . Pi+1 in a timely manner, then
Pi requests resolve.
6.3. Pi → Pj : PCSPi ((m, a), Pj , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
6.4. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, a), Pi , T) (i > j ≥ 1)
If Pi does not receive a-level promises from Pi−1 . . . P1 in a timely manner, then
Pi requests resolve.
6.5. Pi → Pj : PCSPi ((m, a), Pj , T) (a ≥ j > i)
Wait for signatures and (n+1)-level promises from higher-numbered signers
7. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, n+ 1), Pi , T), SPj (m, 1) (n ≥ j > i)
If Pi does not receive signatures and (n+1)-level promises from Pn . . . Pi+1 in a timely manner, then Pi requests resolve.
Send signatures and (n+1)-level promises to signers
8. Pi → Pj : PCSPi ((m, n+ 1), Pj , T), SPi (m, 1) (j /= i)
Wait for signatures from lower-numbered signers
9. Pj → Pi : PCSPj ((m, n+ 1), Pi , T), SPj (m, 1) (i > j ≥ 1)
If Pi does not receive signatures and (n+1)-level promises from Pi−1 . . . P1 in a timely manner, then Pi requests resolve.
(1) j > i and Pj presents to T a k-level promise from Pi such that k > hi(m), or
(2) j < i and Pj presents to T a k-level promise from Pi such that k > li(m).
Abort and Resolve are described in detail in Tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2
Revised GM multi-party contract-signing protocol—Abort for Pi
The first time T is contacted for contract m (either abort or resolve), T initialises S(m) to ∅ and validated(m) to false.
1. Pi → T: SPi (m, Pi , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort)
if not validated(m) then
if S(m) = ∅ then T stores ST (SPi (m, Pi , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort))
S(m) = S(m) ∪ {i}
li = 1
2. T→Pi : ST (SPj (m, Pj , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort))
else (validated(m)=true)
3. T→Pi : {SPi ((m, i))}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
where j is the level of the promise from Pj that was converted to a
universally-verifiable signature during the resolve protocol.
4. Analysis
Notation. PCSi,j is a shorthand for PCS

i , PCS

j . These are th level promises (i.e. private contract signatures) on
m issued by agents Pi and Pj to an agent whose identity is clear from the context. For example, when we say “P1’s
request contains PCS42,3”, we mean that P1’s request contains 4th level promises issued by agents P2 and P3 to P1.
Of course, upon reception of a resolve request from Pi , T must check that all promises in it were issued to Pi .
4.1. An attack on fairness against the Revised GM protocol
We demonstrate an attack against fairness on the revised version of the protocol that involves ﬁve partici-
pants. Later, we generalise it to show that the protocol cannot guarantee fairness for any n ≥ 5 whatever the
trusted authority T does. This shows that there is no Resolve sub-protocol for T that would ﬁx the ﬂaw, and
thus, the structure of the message exchange in GM’s Main protocol is ﬂawed. We call it a resolve-impossibility
result for T and it is applicable to both the original and the revised versions of the protocol.
Suppose that agents P1, . . . , P5 decide to sign a contract m using the Revised GM protocol. They optimisti-
cally execute the Main sub-protocol up to a point, where P4 sends its signature and 6th-level promise on m to all
participants (step 9 in Table 1). Now suppose P1 and P3 do not send their signatures onm to P4. Hence, according
to the protocol P4 sends a resolve request to T , but we suppose that it is delayed by the intruder long enough,
until the following sequence of events is completed:
• P5 requests abort from T . Abort is granted as no other request was made to T regarding m (i.e. S(m) = ∅),
which results in l5 = 1.
• P1 requests resolve from T with a message that contains PCS42,3,4, PCS15. As P5 was previously granted abort
(i.e. S(m) = {P5}) and 5 = l5 = 1, T does not overturn its previous abort decision, but sends abort to P1
and sets h1 = 4 (T presumes that P1 requested resolve at the step 6.2 of the main sub-protocol).
• P3 requests resolve from T with a message containing PCS41,2, PCS54,5 that also results in an abort reply,
as 1 = h1 = 4 and S(m) = {P5, P1}. T sets l3 = 5 (thinking that P3 is at the step 6.4).
• P2 sends a resolve request to T that has PCS51,3,4,5. However, once more, T replies with abort since
3 = l3 = 5 and P3 ∈ S(m), and sets h2 = 5 (T presumes that P2 is in step 7).
Note that although P2 received an abort from T , he is not in an unfair state, since he did not send his signature
on m to any signatory.
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Table 3
Revised GM multi-party contract-signing protocol—Resolve
The first time T is contacted for contract m (either abort or resolve), T initialises S(m) to ∅ and validated(m) to false.
1. Pi → T : SPi ({PCSPj ((m, j), Pi , T)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i} , SPi ((m, 1)))
T checks that the format of this message is one of the five permitted formats mentioned in the text.
if i ∈ S(m) then
–|| T ignores the message|
–
else if validated(m) then
2. T → Pi : {SPj ((m, j))}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
where j is the level of the promise from Pj that was converted to a
universally-verifiable signature.
else if S(m) = ∅ then
validated(m):=true
3. T → Pi : {SPj ((m, j))}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
else (validated(m)=false ∧ S(m) /= ∅)
a) If there is some p < i in S(m) such that p ≤ hp (m), or if there is some p > i
in S(m) such that p ≤ lp (m), then T sends back the stored abort
ST (SPj (m, Pj , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort)) to Pi . T adds i to S(m), and computes
hi(m) and li(m) as follows
(hi(m), li(m))= (i+1, 0), if i = 1 (intuitively, P1 has contacted T in either step 6.2 of
the main protocol with a = i+1 + 1 or in step 7 of the main
protocol),
= (0, i), if 1 < i and i−1 = i − 1 (intuitively, Pi has contacted T in step
5 of the main protocol),
= (i−1, i−1), if 1 < i < n, i ≤ i−1 < n and i+1 ≤ i−1 (intuitively, Pi has
contacted T in step 6.2 of the main protocol with a = i−1 + 1),
= (i−1, i−1 + 1),if 1 < i < n, i ≤ i−1 < n and i+1 > i−1 (intuitively, Pi has
contacted T in step 6.4 of the main protocol with a = i−1 + 1),
= (n, n), if 1 < i < n and i−1 = i+1 = n. (intuitively, Pi has contacted
T in step 7 of the main protocol).
= (n+ 1, n+ 1), if 1 < i < n, i−1 = n and i+1 = n+ 1. (intuitively, Pi has con-
tacted T in step 9 of the protocol).
= (0, n+ 1), if i = n and i−1 = n. (intuitively, Pn has contacted T in step
9 of the main protocol).
b) Otherwise, T sends {SPj ((m, j))}j∈{1,...,n}\{i} to Pi , stores all the
signatures, and sets validated(m) to true.
Now P4’s resolve request containing PCS51,2,3, PCS
6
5 reaches T , but it results in an abort reply, since
2 = h2 = 5 and P2 ∈ S(m). Recall that P4 has already sent his signature onm to all participants and P1 and P3 in
particular. Therefore, this is an attack on fairness: P1, P3 and P2 have P4’s signature on the contract m, whereas
P4 does not have any of theirs.
We describe our attack as abort propagation, since the attack is based on a legitimate abort being carried
through a number of participants until it becomes an unfair abort. Although P2 is dishonest in our attack, it is
possible to re-order the events so that the same attack takes place but P2 is honest. T receives evidence of the
dishonesty only of P5, P1 and P3 during the attack, but not of P2. The resolve request of P2 is justiﬁed because P3
and P5 would not send their signature and 6th level promises to P2. The attack sequence could have happened
before P4 sent out his signature and 6th level promises to other signatories.
A. Mukhamedov, M.D. Ryan / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 272–290 279
There are other instantiations of this idea. For example, for the ﬁve signers case P3 could be left in unfair
state if P1, P4 and P5 group up together and act dishonestly in the similar way as in our attack.
4.2. Resolve-impossibility for T
We call the attack on fairness that we described above abort chaining: intuitively, malefactors group together
to propagate T ’s abort decision. When an honest signatory sends out his signature on a contract, but does not
receive signed contracts back, and then asks T to resolve, he receives an abort decision. This is not due to
a fault in T ’s abort or resolve protocols—a closer examination of the attack reveals that T could not have
overturned any previousabortdecisionwhen presentedwith theresolve requests, since themost recent agent
he sent the abort to could have been honest. The following is a more rigorous explanation of this intuition.
4.2.1. Generalising the attack
We show that one can derive an attack against the protocol involving any n ≥ 5 number of signers using the
same pattern of attack as was shown for the ﬁve signers case. For example, if we have n ≥ 5 signers, where P1,
P3 and Pn are dishonest ones, and P4 is the victim, then an attack can proceed in a similar way. The signers opti-
mistically execute the main sub-protocol up to a point, where P4 sends its signature and (n+ 1)th-level promise
on m to all participants. Again, we suppose that P1 and P3 do not send their signatures on m to P4, and therefore
P4 sends a resolve request to T . As before, we suppose this is delayed by the intruder long enough so that the
following sequence is completed:
(1) Pn requests abort from T . Abort is granted as S(m) = ∅, and T sets ln = 1.
(2) P1 requests resolve from T with PCS
n−1
2,...,n−1, PCS1n. Since S(m) = {Pn} and n = ln = 1, T sends abort to
P1 and sets h1 = n− 1.
(3) P3 requests resolve from T with PCS
n−1
1,2 , PCS
n
4,...,n that also results in an abort reply, as 1 = h1 = n− 1
and S(m) = {P5, P1}. T sets l3 = n.
(4) P2 sends a resolve request to T that has PCSn1,...,n. Once more, T replies with abort since 3 = l3 = n
and P3 ∈ S(m), and sets h2 = n.
Now P4’sresolve requestwith PCSn1,2,3, PCS
n+1
5,...,n reaches T , but it results in anabort reply, since 2 = h2 = n
and P2 ∈ S(m). As before, this is an attack on fairness: P1, P3 and P2 have P4’s signature on the contract m,
whereas P4 does not have any of theirs. As before, a similar attack in which P2 is honest can also be con-
structed.
4.2.2. Resolve impossibility
We show that there is no way to adapt the Abort and Resolve protocols to ﬁx this problem. More formally,
we prove that for all protocols for the trusted party T , there exists an execution for the attacker which makes
the protocol unfair for an honest participant.
The proof proceeds as follows. Suppose T is running according to a protocol. Suppose as before that P1, P3
and Pn are dishonest and controlled by the attacker, and P4 is honest. The attacker’s strategy is the one described
above.We show that, nomatter what T does, it is unfair to someonewho could be honest at the time of T ’s action.
Consider Pn’s request for abort from T . Since Pn could have not received (n− 1) level promises from some of
the signers P1, . . . , Pn−1, T must determine that this request is legitimate, and grant the abort. Next, P1 requests
resolve from T with PCSn−12,...,n−1, PCS1n. T determines that this request is valid, as P1 might not have received the
nth level promises from some of the signers P2, . . . , Pn.
• If T resolves, thereby overturning its previous abort decision, this is unfair to Pn, since T has no evidence of
any dishonesty of Pn, who could have halted after its abort request to T .
• If T aborts, then we suppose that P3 requests resolve from T with PCSn−11,2 , PCSn4,...,n. T determines that this
request is valid, since P3 may not have received nth level promise from P1 or P2 (or both). (At this point T has
evidence that Pn dishonestly continued the protocol after requesting abort.)
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– If T resolves, thereby overturning its two previous abort decisions, this is unfair to P1, since T has no
evidence of any dishonesty of P1.
– If T aborts, then we suppose P2 sends a resolve request to T that has PCSn1,...,n. T determines that this is a
valid request, as P3 and Pn might not have sent their signature and (n+ 1)-level promises to P2. (Now T
has evidence that P1 dishonestly continued the protocol after requesting abort.)
- If T resolves, thereby overturning its three previous abort decisions, this is unfair to P3, since T has no
evidence of any dishonesty of P3.
- If T aborts, then we suppose that the intruder allows P4’s resolve request to arrive at T .
+ If T resolves, thereby overturning its four previous abort decisions, this is unfair to P2, since T has no
evidence of any dishonesty of P2.
+ If T aborts, this is unfair to P4, who has honestly sent out his signature.
Thus, no matter what T does, it is unfair to someone who could be honest at the time T takes the decision.
The ﬂaw lies in the main protocol and there is no resolve protocol for T that would ﬁx it.
5. Our protocol
In this section, we introduce a new protocol, also based on PCs. It also consists of three sub-protocols. The
Main protocol, consists of n/2 + 1 rounds. In each round a signer Pi waits for promises from lower num-
bered signers (below), sends its promise to higher numbered signers (above), waits for promises from signers
above and then send its promise to signers below. In the last round signers exchange actual signatures, together
with their promises. If a signer does not receive some of the messages, it either quits the protocol or asks T to
intervene.
5.1. Main protocol for signer Pi
Our main protocol has a cascading structure for exchanging promises among signers. Intuitively, that allows
to commit signers to certain stages of the protocol depending on the promises they send out. For example, for the
case of ﬁve signers (see Fig. 1), when signer P3 sends out his 2-level promises to signers P4, P5, that would imply
that P3 must have received promises from P1, P2 in round 2 and promises from P4, P5 in round 1. If the trusted
party T is requested to restore fairness, it uses such information to deduce dishonest signers who deviated from
the protocol. Also, the total number of rounds in the main protocol n/2 + 1 is chosen such that even if all but
one signers are dishonest and collude, they will not be able to propagate abort decision into the last round of
the protocol when signatures are released. That is, the total number of rounds outnumbers the total number of
requests a coalition of n− 1 dishonest signers can make in order to propagate trusted party’s abort decision.
The protocol begins with each signer waiting for 1-level promises from the signers below. On receipt of these,
it sends its 1-level promises to the signers above it. Then it waits for 1-level promises from above, and on receipt,
sends 1-level promises below. This sequence is repeated for r-level promises, for r ranging from 2 to n/2, as
shown in Fig. 1. Finally, in the last round, n/2 + 1-level promises and signatures are exchanged. The protocol
is deﬁned formally in Table 4.
If expected messages are not received, a participant Pi may simply quit the protocol, or request abort or
resolve from T , depending on where Pi is in the main protocol.
When Pi requests abort it sends to T the message
SPi ((m, Pi , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort))
For the resolve requests Pi sends
SPi ({PCSPj ((m, j), Pi , T)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, SPi (m, 0))
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
1
1
2
2
3
3
4+sig
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Fig. 1. Messages in our Main protocol when n = 5. In order to reduce clutter, each line in the ﬁgure represents a set of messages broadcast
by a single signer to a set of signers. For example, the ﬁrst line stands for 1-level promises sent by P1 to all other signers.
to T , where for j > i, j is the maximum level of promises received from all signers Pj′ with j′ > i, and for i > j,
j is the maximum level of promises received from all signers Pj′ with i > j′:
j =
{
max{ | ∀j′ > i, Pi has received PCSPj′ ((m, ), Pi , T)} if j > i
max{ | ∀j′ < i, Pi has received PCSPj′ ((m, ), Pi , T)} if j < i
(For example, if the maximum level promises P4 receives from P1 and P2 is 3, and from P3 it is 2, then P4 would
send 2-level promises for signers below.) The resolve request that Pi sends to T includes SPi (m, 0) instead of
SPi (m) to simplify a clause in Table 6.
The format of the resolve requests is chosen in such a way that the requesting signer Pi can attest its position
in a run of the protocol to the trusted party, as well as provide evidence to T of how far other signers are engaged
in the protocol’s run. Also, if T replies with an abort token to Pi’s resolve request, T infers (and stores) the highest
levels of promises that (honest) Pi could have sent to signers below and above from the promises in Pi’s resolve
request.
Remarks. In our protocol it is possible for any recipient of a signed contract to deduce from its structure
whether it was produced by a signer or it was enforced by T . When it is undesirable for an “outsider” to know
whether the signed contract was produced optimistically or with the help of the trusted party, the following
simple changes can be introduced in our protocol: use trusted party invisible PCS promises; replace the signa-
tures SPi (m) exchanged in the last round of the Main protocol with SPi (m, 1); and, add 1-level promises from all
signers to all of Pi’s resolve requests, so that if T decides to enforce m, it replies with {SPi (m, 1)}j∈{1,...,n}. With
those changes, it is impossible for any party not involved in the protocol to tell whether SPi (m, 1) was produced
optimistically or with the help of the trusted party.
5.2. Protocol for T
For each contract m with signers P1, . . . , Pn, when T learns about the contract (through abort or resolve
request) it sets up a variable validated initiated to false, which indicates if T decided to enforce the contract
and has a full set of signatures (some converted by T from promises). T must reliably know the position of each
signer in the run of the protocol, which can be deduced from the list of signers included in the contract text m. T
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Table 4
Our Main protocol for signer Pi
Round 1
(1) For each j < i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, 1), Pi , T) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then quit.
(2) For each j > i, send promise PCSPi ((m, 1), Pj , T) to Pj .
(3) For each j > i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, 1), Pi , T) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then request abort.
(4) For each j < i, send promise PCSPi ((m, 1), Pj , T) to Pj .
For r = 2 to n/2: Round r
5. For each j < i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, r), Pi , T) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then request resolve.
6. For each j > i, send promise PCSPi ((m, r), Pj , T) to Pj .
7. For each j > i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, r), Pi , T) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then request resolve.
8. For each j < i, send promise PCSPi ((m, r), Pj , T) to Pj .
Round n/2 + 1
9. For each j < i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, n/2 + 1), Pi , T) and signature SPj (m) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then request resolve.
10. For each j /= i, send promise PCSPi ((m, n/2 + 1), Pj , T) and signature SPi (m) to Pj .
11. For each j > i, wait for promise PCSPj ((m, n/2 + 1), Pi , T) and signature SPj (m) from Pj .
If any of them is not received in a timely manner, then request resolve.
also maintains a set S(m) of indexes of parties that contacted it in the past and received an abort token. This set
is used when T considers whether to overturn its previous abort decision. For each signer Pi such that i ∈ S(m),
T also maintains two integer variables hi(m) and li(m). T sets the values for those variables according to the
levels of promises Pi supplies in his request: the promises in Pi’s request attest to T how far Pi was involved in a
run of the protocol, and from that information T notes the highest levels of promises that honest Pi could have
sent to other signers when it stopped executing the Main protocol. Intuitively, hi(m) is the highest level promise
Pi could have sent to any signer above, and similarly, li(m) is the highest level of promise Pi could have sent to
a signer below. This construction was inspired by the paper of Chadha et al. [7], even though it does not work
for the protocol they consider [16].
Depending on the request T executes either Abort or Resolve protocol.
5.2.1. Abort protocol
When T receives an abort message from Pi , it adds i to the set S(m). Then if the protocol has already been
successfully resolved it sends back a signed contract; otherwise, it sends back an abort token (see Table 5).
5.2.2. Resolve protocol
The resolve messages that T receives are designed so that T can infer what promises an honest signer could
have sent andwhether all the previous requests weremade by dishonest signers. The protocol works is as follows:
(1) T checks that all promises and signatures are valid, and promises from above and below are consistent
(for details, see Table 6. If any of the checks fail, T ignores the request.
(2) If there has been no previous query to T on m, i.e. validated is false, it derives a signed contract by
converting all the promises contained in the resolve request to universally-veriﬁable signatures. T puts the
signed contract in its database, sends it back in reply to the request, and sets validated to true.
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Table 5
Our Abort protocol for T
The ﬁrst time T is contacted for contract m (either abort or resolve), T initialises S(m) to ∅ and validated to false.
If the abort message SPi (m, Pi , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort) is received from Pi
Check that the signature is valid
if not validated then
if S(m) = ∅ then store ST (SPi (m, Pi , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort))
S(m) = S(m) ∪ {i}
hi(m) := 1; li(m) = 0
Send stored ST (SPj (m, Pj , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort)) to Pi ,
where Pj is the participant that ﬁrst requested abort.
else
Send {SPj ((m, j))}j∈{1,...,n}\{i} to Pi
where j is the level of the promise from Pj that was converted to a
universally-veriﬁable signature during the resolve protocol.
(3) If there has been a positive resolution before, i.e. validated is true, T sends back the stored signed
contract.
(4) If there has been an abort, T replies with an abort token or overturns its previous abort decision if it
deduces that all the previous requests were made by dishonest signers. T deduces that Pj is dishonest from
Pi’s resolve request if: Pi presents to T a promise made by Pj such which shows that Pj continued the
protocol after making a request to T .
The protocol is deﬁned formally in Table 6.
6. Properties of our protocol
Our protocol respects timeliness, since all signers can choose to stop waiting (quit, request abort or resolve)
at any time they are waiting to receive a message. In order to prove fairness, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If a resolve request in round r > 1 results in an abort decision, then:
(1) for all r′ such that 1 < r′ < r there are two resolve requests in round r′ that resulted in an abort decision.
(2) there is an abort request in round 1.
Proof. 1. We deﬁne the following predicates:
A(r): there exists a resolve request in round r from some signer Pi that results in an abort decision. Pi’s request
has r − 1 level promises from all other signers. We call such requests “type A”.
B(r): there exists a resolve request in round r from some signer Pi that results in an abort decision. Pi’s request
has r level promises from signers Pj , where j < i and r − 1 level promises from Pj where j > i. We call such
requests “type B”.
Point 1 of the lemma states that if r > 1 then A(r) ∨ B(r) → ∀r′.(1 < r′ < r → A(r′) ∧ B(r′)). We show this by
proving the following: (a) A(r) ∧ r > 2 → B(r − 1); (b) B(r) ∧ r > 1 → A(r).
To show (a): Suppose A(r) ∧ r > 2. Let Pi be the signer whose request results in abort. Pi’s request has r − 1
level promises from all other signers. So, there has been a resolve request made by some signer Pk in round r − 1
(otherwise according to T ’s protocol any previous abort would be overturned). Moreover, k can be chosen to be
less than i, since according to T ’s protocol, if all such k were greater than i, than Pi’s request would have resulted
in resolve. Therefore, Pk ’s resolve request contains r − 1 level promises from below and r − 2 level promises
from above, since if it had only r − 2 level promises then Pi’s request would overturn the abort received by Pk .
Therefore, Pk ’s request shows B(r − 1).
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Table 6
Our Resolve protocol for T
The ﬁrst time T is contacted for contract m (either abort or resolve), T initialises S(m) to ∅ and validated to false.
If the resolve message SPi ({PCSPj ((m, j), Pi , T)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, SPi (m, 0)) is received
Check that promises and signature are valid, and promises from above and below are consistent, i.e.:
for all j < i, check that j = i−1
for all j > i, check that j = i+1
check that i−1 = i+1 or i−1 = i+1 + 1
if i ∈ S(m) or one of the above checks failed then
ignore the message
else if S(m) = ∅ then
validated := true
Send {SPj (m, j)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i} to Pi
else if validated then
Send {SPj (m, j)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i} to Pi
where j is the level of the promise from Pj that was converted to a universally-veriﬁable signature, or 0.
else // note that validated=false ∧ S(m) /= ∅
if ∃p ∈ S(m) ((p < i ∧ p ≤ hp (m)) ∨ (p > i ∧ p ≤ lp (m))) then
Send the stored abort token ST (SPj (m, Pj , (P1, . . . , Pn), abort)) to Pi
S(m) := S(m) ∪ {i}
Compute hi(m) and li(m) as follows:
if i = 1
// P1 has contacted T in some step 7 or 11 of the main protocol
(hi(m), li(m)) = (2 + 1, 0)
else if i = n
// Pn has contacted T in some step 5 or 9 of the main protocol
(hi(m), li(m)) = (0, n−1)
else if 1 < i < n and i+1 = i−1
// Pi has contacted T in some step 5 or 9 of the main protocol
(hi(m), li(m)) = (i+1, i+1)
else if 1 < i < n and i−1 > i+1
// Pi has contacted T in some step 7 or 11 of the main protocol
(hi(m), li(m)) = (i+1 + 1, i+1)
else
Convert the promises into signatures {SPj (m, j)}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
Store the signatures
Send the signatures to Pi
validated := true
For (b): Suppose B(r) and r − 1. Let Pi be the signer whose request results in abort. Pi’s request has r-level
promises from below and r − 1-level promises from above. Since Pi’s request results in abort, there has been a
resolve request made by some other signer in round r′ ≤ r. To see this, suppose that the highest r′ for which
there is a resolve request by a signer Pk other than Pi resulting in abort is less than r.
• if Pk ’s request is type B, then T sets hk(m) = r − 1, lk(m) = r − 2.
• if k < i, then Pi’s request has an r-level promise from Pk , contradicting hk(m) = r − 1. So T overturns Pk ’s
abort.
• if k > i, then Pi’s request has an r − 1-level promise from Pk , contradicting lk(m) = r − 2. Again, T over-
turns Pk ’s abort.
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• if Pk ’s request is type A, then T sets hk(m) = lk(m) = r − 2. Pi’s request has an r − 1-level promise from Pk
contradicting hk(m) or lk(m) as above. So T overturns Pk ’s abort.
Thus, in all cases, the assumption r′ < r leads to contradiction; and therefore r′ = r. Pk ’s request proves A(r).
2. If there is no abort in round 1, then according to T ’s protocol, any request by any participant in a later
round will result in resolve. 
Lemma 2. If T issues abort to Pi in a round r > 1 and then later resolve to Pj , then Pi is dishonest.
Proof. Suppose Pi gets abort at round r > 1. The variables hi and li are set according to T ’s Resolve protocol.
We verify that hi is the highest level promise Pi could have sent to any signer above, and similarly, li(m) is the
highest level of promise Pi could have sent to a signer below. There are four cases to consider:
• i = 1. Then hi = 2 + 1 = . . . = n + 1 since P1 sends out  + 1-level promises after receiving all -level prom-
ises, and li = 0 because P1 does not send any promises to below.
• i = n. Then hi = 0 since Pn does not send any promises to above, and li = n−1 = . . . = 1 since Pn has received
-level promises from everyone before he sends out any -level promises.
• 1 < i < n and all the k ’s are equal. Pi has requested resolve while waiting for promises from below, and the
evidence it sends are the promises it got in the previous round, which is now complete and it has sent out its
promises in that round too. Therefore hi = li = k for all k .
• 1 < i < n and 1 = . . . = i−1 /= i+1 = . . . = n. Here, Pi’s request for resolve is while waiting for promises
from above, and its evidence consists of promises it received in two different rounds. The promises it has
sent to signers above are i+1 + 1-level promises, and to below they are i+1-level promises, so hi and li are
set accordingly.
Now Pj asks for resolve with a request that contains PCSPi ((m, 
′
i ), Pj , T). Since this request does not result
in abort, the conditions for abort (which begin “∃p” in Table 6) must fail. Therefore, for all p , (p < j → ′p >
hp) ∨ (p > j → ′p > lp ). Take p = i andwe obtain i < j ∧ ′i > hi or i > j ∧ ′i > li; each case includes evidence
that Pi continued the protocol since its request to T and is therefore dishonest. 
Theorem 1. The optimistic multi-party contract signing protocol above is fair.
Proof. Assume Pi is an honest signer participating in the protocol to sign a contract m. Suppose Pi executed the
protocol and decided failed, and some signer Pj decided signed. Then Pj has Pi’s signature on m, because either:
(1) Pi sent it in the last round of the main protocol; or (2) T converted Pi’s promise to Pj into a signed contract
for Pj . We consider the two cases in turn.
(1) Suppose Pi executed the last round of the protocol and sent out its signature on m. Then i < n since Pn
does not send out his signature until he has received everyone else’s. Thus, Pi requested resolve from T in
the last round with the request
SPi ({PCSPj ((m, n/2 + 1), Pi , T)}j∈{1,...,i−1},
{PCSPj ((m, n/2), Pi , T)}j∈{i+1,...,n}, SPi (m))
and received abort. Since i < n and Pi gets abort in the last round, T has evidence to overturn any abort
issued in any previous round. Since T does not overturn all previous aborts, there is an abort given to Pk
with k > i in the last round. Thus Pi and Pk got abort in the ﬁnal round (n/2 + 1). By Lemma 1, rounds 2
to n/2 have two failed resolve requests and round 1 has an abort request. The total number of requests
is thus 2 + (n/2 − 1)× 2 + 1 = 2n/2 + 1. This is at least n+ 1, but there are only n signers and each
signer can make at most one request: a contradiction.
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(2) Suppose T returned a signed contract in response to a resolve request from Pj . There are three cases to
consider:
• If Pi quit the protocol in round 1, T could not have returned a signed contract, since Pi did not release
any promises.
• If Pi requested abort in round 1 from T , then it could have sent 1-level promises to signers above. Hence,
T sets hi(m) = 1 and, since Pi is honest, it does not release further promises. According to T ’s protocol,
T could not have returned a signed contract, since any subsequent resolve request would only have
PCSPi ((m, 1), Pk , T), where k > i.
• If Pi received an abort decision for its resolve request in some round 1 < r ≤ n/2 + 1, and then Pi’s
promise to Pj got converted to a signature, then by Lemma 2 Pi is dishonest.
In all three cases we reach a contradiction. 
Abuse-freeness. Intuitively, the protocol is abuse-free, because of the use of private-contract signatures. No
party has publicly veriﬁable information about Pi’s commitment to the contract until a point from which Pi has
the power to acquire a signed contract from all the other participants. (In future work, we intend to investigate
our protocol in terms of formal deﬁnitions of abuse-freeness, such as that of [13].)
Timeliness. Our protocol also satisﬁes timeliness, since a participant can give up waiting for a message at any
time and take recourse with the trusted party.
Remarks
Our protocol above works for up to n− 1 dishonest signers. It can be optimised in the same way as it was
done by Baum-Waidner and Waidner [6]: if the number of dishonest signers t is less and is known advance to
all honest signers, then we can reduce the number of messages for the Main protocol. For Baum-Waidner, it
results in (t + 2)n(n− 1) messages; in our case it is ((t + 1)/2 + 1)n(n− 1).
The number of messages of the “optimistic” execution can also be reduced if we allow signers to forward
other signers’ messages. In particular, a signer Pi instead of broadcasting its promise to all signers above, can
now send those messages to Pi+1, who will then send Pi’s promises intended for other signers (together with his)
to Pi+2, and so on. Similarly, the same changes are applied when Pi sends promises to signers below. As a result,
the number of messages sent in the “optimistic” execution is now (n/2 + 1)2(n− 1).
Garay and MacKenzie [11] state that any complete and fair optimistic contract-signing protocol with n par-
ticipants requires at least n rounds in an optimistic run. Our result appears to contradict that statement, but it is
not clear since they did not deﬁne what a round is. Different protocols group messages into rounds in different
ways, so the only meaningful comparison is by number of messages in the optimistic execution.
7. Analysis using NuSMV
As an extra check, we have modelled our protocol using the NuSMV model checker [8] for the case of ﬁve
signers, and proved fairness in that case. Our NuSMV model abstracts away from details of the cryptographic
primitives and the Dolev-Yao attacker. Its purpose is to check for situations in which the trusted party fails to
respond fairly to honest participants. This includes checking for abort-propagation attacks of the kind described
in Section 4.1. First, we model a situation in which all ﬁve signers have completed rounds 1, 2, 3 of the Main
protocol – i.e. they have exchanged all 1, 2 and 3-level promises, but they have not yet sent out any 4-level
promises or signatures (see Fig. 1). No abort should be possible if all signers have got to this point, because the
signers are about to release their signatures. In the previous protocol it was possible at this stage for P1, P2, P3
and P5 to gang up on P4, by releasing a well-chosen sequence of requests to T and forcing T to issue an abort
to P4, resulting in unfairness. We show that such attacks are impossible in the new protocol. Next, we consider
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the situation in which an honest signer receives abort, and discontinues the protocol. We show that such aborts
will not be overturned.
The NuSMV code models T ’s behaviour in response to a non-deterministically chosen sequence of requests.
A request is modelled by the following parameters:
• requester, which may be any of the participants {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
• reqType, which may be abort or resolve;
• reqTauLeft, the values of j for j < requester;
• reqTauSame, a boolean indicating whether the values of j for j > requester are equal to or one less
than reqTauLeft.
We derive reqTauRight from these parameters (it is either reqTauLeft or reqTauLeft − 1, according
to the value of reqTauSame). Note that if reqType=abort then the values of reqTauLeft and reqTau-
Right are irrelevant and are ignored, and if requester=1 (resp. requester=5) then reqTauLeft (resp.
reqTauRight) is irrelevant and ignored.
T reacts to these queries by updating its state, which is modelled by variables as follows:
• Booleans requested i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, indicating whether Pi has made a request in the past. The pro-
tocol stipulates that each Pi may make only one request, and repeat requests are ignored.
• A boolean validated, as required in the protocol.
• Booleans S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, whichmodel the set S required in the protocol. The boolean Si indicates whether
i ∈ S .
• Integers hi and li, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, as required by the protocol.
NuSMV models these variables synchronously; that is, there is a global clock, and each tick of the clock causes
all of the variables to be updated. In our model, a tick of the clock corresponds to a request being made to T .
For each variable, the code contains a clause of the form
next(variable) :=
case
condition1 : expression1;
condition2 : expression2;
. . .
condition n : expression n;
esac;
This describes how the value of variable in the next state is determined. Each of the conditions is evaluated
in turn until one of them evaluates to true; in that case, the corresponding expression is evaluated and the result
is the next value of variable. Values 0 and 1 represent booleans false and true respectively.
Two conditions are required repeatedly in the code; they are given in theDEFINE section. The conditiondu-
plicateRequest describeswhether the current request is froma requesterwho has alreadymade a request, i.e.
whether
∨5
i=1(requester = i ∧ requestedi). If this is true, the request is ignored, i.e. no variable is updated
in response to the request. The condition confirmPrevAbort denotes the condition ∃p ∈ S(m)((p < i ∧ p ≤
hp (m)) ∨ (p > i ∧ p ≤ lp (m))) present in the resolve protocol. It is relevant when a resolve request occurs in
a situation that an abort has previously been granted, and it determines whether the previous abort will be
conﬁrmed or overturned.
Consider, for example, the code describing the evolution of h1:
1 next(h1) := case
2 duplicateRequest : h1;
3 !(requester=1) : h1;
4 reqType = abort & !validated : 1;
5 reqType = abort : h1;
6 S1 | S_empty | validated : h1;
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7 confirmPrevAbort : case
8 requester=1 : reqTauRight + 1;
9 requester=5 : 0;
10 reqTauLeft=reqTauRight : reqTauRight;
11 1 : reqTauRight+1;
12 esac;
13 1: h1;
14 esac;
Line 2 indicates that repeat requests are ignored (i.e. the value of h1 does not change). Similarly, h1 does not
change if the requester is other than P1. By the time we get to line 4, we know that the request is not a repeat
request and it is from P1. Line 4 says that if the request was an abort and the contract has not been validated,
h1 is set to 1; otherwise (line 5) if the request was abort, h1 is left unchanged. Line 6 (which is reached only if
the request is a resolve) says that if either S1 holds (i.e. i ∈ S), or S = ∅, or validated is true, then h1 is not
updated. Here, we are literally following the pseudocode for the trusted party (Tables 5 and 6). In line 7, the
condition confirmPrevAbort is evaluated, and if it is true, then a further case statement indicates how h1
is to be updated. The full code is given at [14]. It may be noted that the code is not optimal. For example, in the
fragment above, the inner case statement evaluates requester, even though we know that requester = 1
if we get as far as that case statement. This apparent inefﬁciency, due to the mechanical way the clauses were
generated, has no real computational cost for the model checker because at compile time it reduces all these
clauses to a normal form, called a binary decision diagram, which is independent of this kind of boolean
redundancy.
The queries we put to NuSMV model fairness as two sub-properties:
(1) If an honest signer releases signatures to another signer and later makes a resolve request, the request
will be granted. This property guarantees that the kind of abort propagation attacks in Section 4.1 are
impossible for our protocol.
(2) If an honest signer receives an abort, then that abort will not be overturned by later requests.
For the ﬁrst property, we suppose that a non-repeat resolve request from a signer in the last stage of the
protocol (i.e. with l = r = 3) has been made; this must result in validated becoming true. This is written in
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) as shown below; this formula evaluates to true.
SPEC AG (reqType=resolve & !duplicateRequest &
reqTauLeft=3 & reqTauRight=3 -> AX validated)
For the second property, we consider all the possible circumstances in which a honest signer makes a request
to T and receives an abort response. The fact that the signer is honest means that it does not continue to release
promises after it contacts T . This means that certain requests to T from other signers are impossible (they need
the later promises from the honest signer).
For example, suppose P4 requests resolve with l = r = 2 and gets abort. If P4 is honest, this means that
P1 cannot later request resolve with r = 3, and none of P2, P3, P4 can request resolve with l = r = 3, and
P5 cannot request resolve with l = 3. The query for NuSMV is: under these hypotheses, could P4’s abort be
overturned? We represent the query as follows: let p represent that P4 requests resolve with l = r = 2, i.e.
p = requester=4 & !duplicateRequest &
reqType=resolve & reqTauLeft=2 & reqTauRight=2
and let q represent the later requests made impossible by the assumption of P4’s honesty, i.e.
q = (requester=1 & reqTauRight=3) |
(requester>=2 & requester <=4 &
reqType=resolve & reqTauLeft=3 & reqTauRight=3) |
(requester=5 & reqType=resolve & reqTauLeft=3)
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We write v to abbreviate the variable validated. We now model the desired property as saying: whenever
p occurs and results in abort, then if q remains false then v will remain false. This property is tricky to represent
in CTL. In LTL it is much easier: we may write
G ( p & X !v → !v W q )
where W is weak until. NuSMV can check LTL formulas but it is much more efﬁcient at checking CTL formu-
las. Using the techniques explained in Chapter 3 of [12], one can translate this LTL formula into the following
equivalent CTL formula:
AG( p -> AX( !v → !E [ !q U (!q & v) ] ))
This formula evaluates to true. Different circumstances of possible abort overturns correspond to different
values of p and q. Some examples are shown in the code available at [14].
8. Conclusion
We have shown that the revised version of Garay and Mackenzie’s protocol presented in [7] fails the fairness
property, for the cases n ≥ 5. We also demonstrated that our attack shows that the protocol cannot guaran-
tee fairness for any n ≥ 5 whatever the trusted authority T does. This means that no trusted party protocol is
possible in order to ﬁx the unfairness. The ﬂaw lies in the structure of the message exchange of the Garay and
Mackenzie’s main protocol.
We also presented a new multi-party contract signing protocol which uses private contract signatures, and
we proved that it satisﬁes fairness and formally analysed in NuSMV model checker for the case of ﬁve signers.
It also satisﬁes informal notions of timeliness and abuse-freeness.
Our scheme improves on the state-of-the-art protocol by Baum-Waidner and Waidner [6] in two important
aspects. Firstly, our scheme requires only half the number of messages to complete “optimistic” execution. (In
contrast with Baum-Waidner’s improvement reported in [5], we do not require the unrealistic assumptions that
the number of dishonest signers is known in advance to the trusted party, and that honest signers don’t quit the
protocol.) Secondly, our scheme does not use a non-standard notion of a signed contract.
In future work, we aim to supplement our proof with a formal veriﬁcation the protocol in the case of arbi-
trary n against the claimed properties, using a framework such as applied pi calculus [1], strand spaces [19] or
higher-order logic [17]. This is a challenging task since state-of-the-art formal analysis methods do not cope well
with open-ended protocols (i.e. those that may involve arbitrary number of parties in a single run). As our work
shows, analysis of such a protocol for a ﬁxed number of signers may not be enough. We also intend to evaluate
our protocol against formal deﬁnitions of abuse-freeness such as [13].
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Rohit Chadha, Steve Kremer and Andre Scedrov for their helpful comments about the
attack presented in Section 2 of this paper; and also allowing us to use their Latex source of the description of
their protocol, particularly the source for Tables 1–3. Thanks also to Steve Kremer for interesting conversations
about the meaning of fairness.
References
[1] M. Abadi, C. Fournet, Mobile values, new names, and secure communication, in: H.R. Nielson (Ed.), Proceedings of the 28th ACM
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, ACM, London, UK, 2001.
[2] N. Asokan, M. Schunter, M. Waidner, Optimistic protocols for multi-party fair exchange, Research Report RZ 2892 (# 90840), IBM
Research, 1996.
[3] N. Asokan, M. Schunter, M. Waidner, Optimistic protocols for fair exchange, in: T. Matsumoto (Ed.), Fourth ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, ACM Press, Zurich, Switzerland, 1997.
290 A. Mukhamedov, M.D. Ryan / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 272–290
[4] N. Asokan, V. Shoup, M. Waidner, Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures, in: Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 1998, vol.
1403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1998.
[5] B. Baum-Waidner, Optimistic asynchronous multi-party contract signing with reduced number of rounds, in: F. Orejas, P.G. Spirakis,
J. van Leeuwen (Eds.), Automata, Languages and Programming, 28th International Colloquium, ICALP 2001, Crete, Greece, July
8–12, vol. 2076 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2001.
[6] B. Baum-Waidner,M.Waidner, Round-optimal and abuse free optimistic multi-party contract signing, in: U.Montanari, J.D.P. Rolim,
E.Welzl (Eds.), Automata, Languages and Programming, 27th International Colloquium, ICALP 2000,Geneva, Switzerland, July 9–15,
vol. 1853 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2000.
[7] R. Chadha, S. Kremer, A. Scedrov, Formal analysis of multi-party fair exchange protocols, in: R. Focardi (Ed.), 17th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE Computer Society Press, Asilomar, CA, USA, 2004.
[8] A. Cimatti, E. Clarke, E. Giunchiglia, F. Giunchiglia, M. Pistore, M. Roveri, R. Sebastiani, A. Tacchella, NuSMV Version 2: an open-
source tool for symbolic model checking, in: Proc. International Conference on Computer-Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV 2002), vol. 2404
of LNCS, Springer, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2002.
[9] S. Even, Y. Yacobi, Relations among public key signature systems, Technical Report, Technion, Haifa, 1980.
[10] J.A. Garay, M. Jakobsson, P.D. MacKenzie, Abuse-free optimistic contract signing, in: Advances in Cryptology—Crypto 1999, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1666, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[11] J.A. Garay, P.D. MacKenzie, Abuse-free multi-party contract signing, in: P. Jayanti (Ed.), International Symposium on Distributed
Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1693, Springer-Verlag, Bratislava, Slavak Republic, 1999.
[12] M.R. Huth,M.D. Ryan, Logic in Computer Science:Modelling andReasoning about Systems, second ed., Cambridge University Press,
2004.
[13] D. Kähler, R. Küsters, T. Wilke, A Dolev-Yao-based deﬁnition of abuse-free protocols, in: Proceedings of the 33rd International
Colloqium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP’06), vol. 4052 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2006.
[14] A. Mukhamedov, M. Ryan, NuSMV code for ﬁve signers, From Mark Ryan’s web page (currently www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼mdr/), follow
the link for Contract Signing.
[15] A. Mukhamedov, M. Ryan, Improved multi-party contract signing, in: Proceedings of the Financial Cryptography, LNCS, Springer,
2007.
[16] A. Mukhamedov, M.D. Ryan, Resolve-impossibility for a contract-signing protocol, in: 19th Computer Security Foundations Work-
shop (CSFW 2006), IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, 2006.
[17] L.C. Paulson, The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols, J. Comput. Secur. 6 (1–2) (1998) 85–128.
[18] B. Pﬁtzmann, M. Schunter, M. Waidner, Optimal efﬁciency of optimistic contract signing, in: 17th Annual ACM Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing, ACM, New York, 1998.
[19] F.J. Thayer Fabrega, J. Herzog, J.D. Guttman, Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct? in: 1998 IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_00/gutt-
man_strands/index.html.
